The heme‐containing cytochromes P‐450 are a ubiquitous family of monooxygenase isozymes responsible for the oxidative metabolism of a wide variety of endogenous as well as exogenous compounds. Many of the compounds metabolized by this enzyme system are effectively detoxified and converted to derivatives more easily eliminated from the organism. However, some compounds can be activated to reactive species capable of eliciting a cascade of toxic lesions, including cancer. Since its discovery nearly 30 years ago, the cytochrome P‐450 enzyme system has (...) received a great deal of attention, particularly in the areas of their mechanisms of metabolism, range of substrate specificity, the purification and characterization of the multiple isozymes and, more recently, the regulation of expression of specific forms. This review will discuss current notions concerning the expression of at least one cytochrome P‐450 isozyme and future directions that should lead to a more complete understanding of cytochrome P‐450 gene expression in general, particularly as it impacts upon biochemical pharmacology. (shrink)

Spanish influence in the New World was particularly acute in the areas of medicine and medical education. From the time of Columbus forward prominent medical experts journeyed to Latin America establishing medical schools and research centers. This essay chronicles the history of Latin America with a strong focus on the physicians and scientists who brought modern scientific medicine, as it wag then known in Western Europe, to the Americas.

The terms “competency” and “decision making capacity” are often used interchangeably in the medical setting. Although competency is a legal determination made by judges, “competency” assessments are frequently requested of psychiatrists who are called to consult on hospitalised patients who refuse medical treatment. In these situations, the bioethicist is called to consult frequently as well, sometimes as a second opinion or “tie breaker”. The psychiatric determination of competence, while a clinical phenomenon, is based primarily in legalism and can be quite (...) different from the bioethics approach. This discrepancy highlights the difficulties that arise when a patient is found to be “competent” by psychiatry but lacking in DMC by bioethics. Using a case, this dilemma is explored and guidance for reconciling the opinions of two distinct clinical specialties is offered. (shrink)

Petr Leonidovich Kapitsa, world-renowned physicist, often turns to themes that at first glance seem far removed from the sphere of his basic scientific interests. He is the author of numerous articles and papers on problems of the development of science and the organization of scientific work . Many have read with interest his remarkable recollections of Rutherford, published in Novy mir.

From the editors of Voprosy filosofii: The editors publish herewith the address by the ranking Soviet physicist Academician Petr Leonidovich Kapitsa, Director of the Institute of Physical Problems of the USSR Academy of Sciences, at the symposium, organized by UNESCO and held in Ulm, West Germany, in 1978, on the hundredth anniversary of the birth of Albert Einstein. The speech was graciously made available to us by Kapitsa. In it the Academician gives his principal attention to the global problems that (...) have interested him of late, on which he has already expressed himself in the pages of our journal . In the form and manner in which its problems are set forth, this address is designed chiefly for the scientists of Western countries present at the Ulm symposium. (shrink)

I should like to begin by removing a misconception to which the title of this lecture may possibly give rise. My concern is not with general propositions regarding certain fairly well-attested human characteristics of the kind to which historians may, from time to time, advert in the course of their work or to which they may appeal in support of the account provided of some particular event or occurrence. I am not myself an historian, and for me to make ex (...) cathedra pronouncements on such topics as these might well seem to constitute an unjustifiable intrusion upon a field about which I am not qualified professionally to speak. My subject lies within the sphere of philosophy of history rather than of history proper; it belongs, in other words, to a branch of philosophical inquiry, and as such relates, not to empirical facts and events of the sort to which the practising historian addresses himself, but to those assumptions, categories and modes of procedure that are, or are believed to be, intrinsic to historical thought and discourse. In this general context I wish to discuss two approaches to the problem of elucidating the character of historical knowledge and explanation. Both of the approaches I have in mind have achieved a considerable measure of support at the present time; they have also been widely understood as offering profoundly divergent — indeed, diametrically opposed — views of what is central to the structure of historical thinking and to the type of activity upon which the historian is essentially engaged. It has on occasions been suggested that what — amongst other things — divides adherents to the views in question is the fact that they are committed to radically different conceptions of the subject-matter of the historical studies; that is to say, of human beings and their activities. In the light of this fundamental disagreement, it is argued, many of the more intractable controversies that have arisen concerning the concepts and interpretative schemes in terms of which it is possible or legitimate to treat the human past become readily intelligible. In what follows I want to examine this claim. First, however, let me give a brief, and necessarily somewhat crude, outline of the two positions I have referred to, starting with one that is often described as ‘positivist’. (shrink)

The target article “Thinking Through Other Minds” (TTOM) offered an account of the distinctively human capacity to acquire cultural knowledge, norms, and practices. To this end, we leveraged recent ideas from theoretical neurobiology to understand the human mind in social and cultural contexts. Our aim was bothsynthetic– building an integrative model adequate to account for key features of cultural learning and adaptation; andprescriptive– showing how the tools developed to explain brain dynamics can be applied to the emergence of social and (...) cultural ecologies of mind. In this reply to commentators, we address key issues, including: (1) refining the concept of culture to show how TTOM and the free-energy principle (FEP) can capture essential elements of human adaptation and functioning; (2) addressing cognition as an embodied, enactive, affective process involving cultural affordances; (3) clarifying the significance of the FEP formalism related to entropy minimization, Bayesian inference, Markov blankets, and enactivist views; (4) developing empirical tests and applications of the TTOM model; (5) incorporating cultural diversity and context at the level of intra-cultural variation, individual differences, and the transition to digital niches; and (6) considering some implications for psychiatry. The commentators’ critiques and suggestions point to useful refinements and applications of the model. In ongoing collaborations, we are exploring how to augment the theory with affective valence, take into account individual differences and historicity, and apply the model to specific domains including epistemic bias. (shrink)